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CASES NOTED
States' Rights in the Outer Continental Shelf
Denied by the United States Supreme Court
In 1969 the State of Maine issued a permit for oil and gas
exploration of the outer continental shelf lands' off its coast.2 Invoking the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, the
United States filed suit against Maine, and joined 12 other states
which bordered on the Atlantic Ocean,3 seeking a declaration that
these states had no rights in outer continental shelf lands and that
these lands were subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the United
States. At stake was not only the right to royalties from the exploita1. The term "outer continental shelf" refers to that portion of the continental shelf lying
beyond the three-mile territorial sea. The concept of legal rights in the continental shelf was
first announced in 1945 by President Truman. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48
Comp.), 59 Stat. 884 (1945). On the same day that the Truman Proclamation was issued,
the United States, also for the first time, defined a juridic, as contrasted to a geologic,
continental shelf when it was stated: "Generally, submerged land which is contiguous to the
continent and which is covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered
as the continental shelf." Pres. Press Release, Sept. 28, 1945, in 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 757, 758 (1965). The concept of a juridic continental shelf was important
to the development of legal rights in the continental shelf because geomorphic factors cause
the depth and distance from shore of the geologic continental shelf to vary widely around the
world, thereby frequently making it difficult to determine the exact location of its outer
boundary. The idea of a juridic continental shelf was subsequently adopted by many nations
and it is now part of international law. International recognition of the rights of coastal
nations in their continental shelves out to a depth of 200 meters occurred in 1958. Convention
on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958, art. 1, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Shelf Convention].
2. The permit covered 3.3 million acres of land which was located 88 miles from the
coast. This constituted only a fraction of the 64 million acres of Atlantic outer continental
shelf lands. See 1 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT-PROPOSED

INCREASE IN ACREAGE TO BE OFFERED FOR OIL AND GAS LEASING IN

THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

173 (1975) [hereinafter cited as

ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].

3. The states were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.
Connecticut was not joined because it borders only on Long Island Sound, which is regarded
as internal waters, thus making the legal issues in dispute not applicable.
The action against Florida was later severed because of unique legal and factual issues.
United States v. Maine, 403 U.S. 949 (1971). Florida asserted that Congress had expressly
approved her claimed boundaries by the Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73. The exact
boundary between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean was also in dispute. The
severed action was consolidated with a related United States-Florida proceeding which was
before the Court and a decision in the combined action was announced on the same day as
that of the noted case. United States v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 1162 (1975).
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tion of rich oil and gas deposits,4 but also the right to control the
ecological conditions under which such exploitation would take
place. Similar rights of non-party states in the other outer continental shelf areas would, by necessity, also be affected by the outcome
of the decision.' Having been appointed by the Supreme Court to
direct the proceedings and take evidence,6 a special master entered
a report which recommended that a decision be rendered in favor
of the United States.7 After oral arguments on the master's report,
and the exceptions to it which had been filed by the states, the
United States Supreme Court held: As an incident of national sovereignty, the United States, to the exclusion of the Atlantic coastal
states, has sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying
the Atlantic Ocean from the boundary of the three-mile territorial
sea' to the outer edge of the continental shelf. United States v.
Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
The Maine decision represents yet another attempt to settle the
continuing federal-state dispute over the power to control offshore
mineral rights. For most of our nation's history, it had been universally assumed that title to lands lying under the territorial sea was
vested in the states? Indeed, when the United States needed parcels
of submerged lands, it obtained deeds to them from the states.' ° The
United States repeatedly refused to issue oil leases for lands under
the territorial sea, declaring that title was in the states.' This assumption rested on an unbroken line of Supreme Court rulings that
4. Estimated at 12 billion barrels of oil and 75 trillion cubic feet of gas. ENVIRONMENTAL
supra note 2, Table 13, at 168.
5. Id. at 169. At stake for non-party states were the rights to another 100 billion barrels
of oil and 600 trillion cubic feet of gas.
6. United States v. Maine, 398 U.S. 947 (1970).
7. Report of Special Master Albert B. Maris, United States v. Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Master's Report]. The report was received by the Supreme Court
in October 1974. United States v. Maine, 95 S. Ct. 29 (1974).
8. The Court indicated that the boundary of the territorial sea was three geographical
miles seaward from the ordinary low watermark and from the outer limits of inland waters
on the coast. The term "ordinary low watermark" has its origin in the Court's decision in
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). Presently, however, the term is without true
legal significance. Under international law, the low water baseline used for measuring territorial seas is that which is chosen by the individual coastal nation. The United States normally uses the mean low watermark, which is the mean mark of all low tides over a lunar
cycle of 18.6 years.
9. The concept of a territorial sea as such did not exist in the early years of the United
States, but as rights in the marginal belt of coastal waters developed, they were assumed to
be in the states. E.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); see United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
10. Legislative History of the Submerged Lands Act, 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1385, 1426 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
11. Id. at 1417.
STATEMENT,
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all right, title and interest of the English Crown in lands lying under
navigable waters passed not to the United States, but to the people
of the several states as sovereigns at the time of the Revolution.
This doctrine, used repeatedly, 3 was extended to states admitted to
the Union after the Revolution on the basis of "equal footing."' 4 The
cases applying this doctrine, however, dealt primarily with property
rights in the land beneath inland navigable waters. 5 The question
of title to lands lying under the territorial sea was never expressly
decided," but the language employed was sufficiently strong to create the impression that the states owned these lands as well."
The United States first thought to question the title of the
states to offshore oil lands in 1937, after great pressure from groups
interested in federal, rather than state, control of offshore leasing.
Early attempts to obtain legislative abrogation of the states' rights
by oil company interests and Navy supporters seeking fuel reserves,
however, were repeatedly rejected by Congress, which refused to
declare title to be in the United States, both before and after World
War II.1s
Finally, in 1947 the Attorney General of the United States
turned to the Supreme Court to have the matter settled in the case
of United States v. California.9 In finding for the United States, the
Court for the first time distingushed between lands lying under
inland navigable waters and those lying under the territorial sea.
12. E.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). Citations to other cases can
be found in the articles cited in note 16 infra.
13. E.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). But cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
14. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
15. For many years the dividing line between "inland" navigable waters (e.g., rivers,
bays, and lakes) and "marginal" navigable waters (the territorial sea) was unsettled. Finally,
in United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), the Supreme Court adopted as the
boundary line the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured as defined in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature April 29,
1958, 119641 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as
Territorial Sea Convention].
16. The Supreme Court cases deciding rights of the coastal states in various submerged
lands prior to 1947 are collected in Note, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in
Submerged Lands of the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L.J. 356, 360 n.35 (1947). See also Note,
Right, Title, and Interest in the TerritorialSea: Federal and State Claims in the United
States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. 463 (1974); Note, The Federal-State Offshore Oil Dispute, 11
WM. & Mary L. Rev. 755 (1970).
17. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947). For example, one case upheld the
title of the State of Illinois to lands under Lake Michigan on the basis that its title and rights
were analogous to "the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tidewaters on the borders of the sea." Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 14y U.S. 387, 437 (1892).
18. Legislative History, supra note 10, at 1417-19.
19. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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The Court rejected California's contention that the original thirteen
colonies acquired ownership over the territorial sea from the English
Crown, under which title California could claim on the basis of
equal footing, because it found that the concept of a territorial sea
was largely the result of later actions by the national government.
The Court, however, indicated that insufficient evidence as to the
historic title of the states was not the basis of its holding. Rather,
the Court found that paramount rights in and power over the territorial sea adhered to the federal government on the basis of its
constitutional role in national defense and its existence as the external sovereign under domestic and international law. These paramount responsibilities, the Court reasoned, necessitated dominion
over such submerged lands as an incident of national sovereignty."
Shortly after the California case was decided, its doctrine was
applied by the Court in United States v. Louisiana2' and United
States v. Texas.2 The State of Louisiana claimed title to a 27-mile
belt of the seabed off her coast on the basis that she had exercised
unchallenged sovereignty over the land since her admission to the
Union. The Supreme Court rejected Louisiana's claim to the threemile belt under the territorial sea, on the basis that it could find no
material differences in either the preadmission or postadmission
history of Louisiana that made her case stronger than that of California. Louisiana's claim to the 24 miles beyond the territorial sea
was also rejected by the Court, with the Court reasoning:
If, as we held in California's case, the three-mile belt is in the
domain of the nation rather than that of the separate States, it
follows a fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit also is. The
20. Mr. Justice Reed dissented because he found California's historic title argument
persuasive. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the grounds that it was improper for the
Court to have considered the merits of the case. He criticized the majority for having confused
dominion, which concerns property and ownership rights, with imperium, which relates to
political sovereignty, and then stated:
To declare that the Government has "national dominion" is merely a way of
saying that vis-a-vis all other nations the Government is the sovereign. If that is
what the Court's decree means, it needs no pronouncement by this Court to confer
or declare such sovereignty. If it means more than that, it implies that the Government has some proprietary interest. That has not been remotely established
except by sliding from absence of ownership by California to ownership by the
United States.
Let us assume, for the present, that ownership by California cannot be
proven. On a fair analysis of all the evidence bearing on ownership, then, this area
is, I believe, to be deemed unclaimed land, and the determination to claim it on
the part of the United States is a political decision not for this Court.
Id. at 45.
21. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
22. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
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ocean seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly
related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and
world commerce than is the marginal sea."
Texas' claim to the land off her coast was based on the fact that
she had been recognized as an independent and sovereign nation by
the United States prior to her admission to the Union. Thus, the
same types of rights which the United States, as an external sovereign, has over the territorial sea had also been possessed by Texas
prior to her admission to the Union. Texas' claim was, therefore,
arguably stronger than that of Louisiana. Nonetheless, it too was
rejected. The Court reasoned that since Texas had been admitted
to the Union on an equal footing with the other states, it did not
matter what claim Texas had to submerged lands as a nation prior
to admission; all such rights were relinquished and passed to the
United States upon admission to the Union since the United States,
as external sovereign, required paramount rights.
In 1953 Congress responded to the California, Louisiana, and
Texas cases with the Submerged Lands Act. The Act quitclaimed
the lands under the territorial sea to the states for the express purpose of abrogating the Californiadoctrine and restoring to the states
that which everyone previously believed to have been theirs.25 With
title of the states to the submerged lands established, the course of
litigation then turned to the construction and effect of the terms of
the Submerged Lands Act. Since Congress could not grant more
than the three miles which the United States claimed as territorial
sea without recognizing similar claims by other nations, the limitation of the quitclaim to three miles led to disputes as to the exact
location of the outer limits of the states' lands. Problems dealt with
in this series of litigation included: (1) the definition of "coastline," 2 (2) the effect of preadmission Mexican and Spanish land
grants which included submerged lands, 7 (3) the interpretation of
states' acts of admission and of any recognition by Congress of marine boundaries greater than three miles, 8 and (4) the use and con23. 339 U.S. at 705.
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
25. Legislative History, supra note 10, at 1399, 1498-99.
26. United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960).
27. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
28. Id. Texas and Florida were found to be entitled to a nine-mile boundary by virtue of
the Congressional resolution annexing Texas, Id. at 65, and Congressional approval of Florida's constitution which claimed nine miles upon her readmission to the Union following the
Civil War pursuant to a Reconstruction act. Id. at 121. Oddly, such boundaries of a state
beyond those claimed by the United States have not been found to be at variance with the
paramount rights doctrine of California.
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struction of "closing lines," "baselines," "historic bays," and other
technical details of boundary measurement."9
Prior to the Maine decision, no case had dealt with the offshore
rights of a state which had originally been a colony. Thus, none of
the colonial states were bound under the doctrine of res judicata by
the holding in Californiathat they had failed to obtain dominion
over the territorial sea. Since all eleven of the colonial states bordering the Atlantic ° were parties to Maine, it could be expected, as did
in fact occur, that the historic title issue would be vigorously contested before the special master. The states sought to show, through
various charters, treaties, and other historical documents, that the
English Crown had established a claim of sovereign jurisdiction and
ownership over coastal waters which passed to the states either at,
or before, the Declaration of Independence." The United States, on
the other hand, in addition to arguing that United States v.
California was controlling, on the basis of stare decisis, sought to
show that the sovereign rights of the Crown, if any, passed not to
the states, but rather to the Continental Congress, and then to the
United States.2 In support of this contention, the United States
alluded to an assumption of sovereignty by the Continental Congress based on acts such as the conduct of international affairs, the
negotiation of treaties, the direction of the national defense, and the
assertion of superior admiralty jurisdiction over the states. 3
The report submitted by the special master recommended that
the historic title argument of the states be rejected, and the Supreme Court agreed. The Court further stated, however, that even
if such rights of external sovereignty did exist in the states as alleged, they passed to the United States upon ratification of the
Constitution on the basis of the Court's prior holding in United
States v. Texas. The Court's decision in Maine thus extends the
constitutional foundation upon which United States v. California
29. See, e.g., United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Alaska,
352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972).
30. Maine was not an original colony, but was created out of Massachusetts and admitted to the Union in 1820. 8 Mass. Acts 248 (1819); Henri, The Atlantic States, Claim to
Offshore Oil Rights: United States v. Maine, 2 ENV. AFFAIRS 827, 832-33 (1973).
31. The historic arguments of the states are outlined in Henri, supra note 30, and summarized in Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A HistoricalRefutation of State
Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1056, 1056 n.2 (1974).
32. For an exhaustive treatment of the historical arguments supporting the United
States' position, see Morris, supra note 31.
33. For example, the Continental Congress passed an act creating a "Court of Appeal in
Cases of Capture," with power to reverse prize proceedings of the highest court of any state.
The jurisdiction of this court was upheld in Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 33 (1795).
Other examples may be found in Morris, supra note 31, at 1074-83.
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was decided to the Atlantic outer continental shelf lands by the
reasoning of United States v. Louisiana. In holding that exclusive
sovereignty by the United States in outer continental shelf lands is
necessary, the Court was effectively restating the federal paramount
rights doctrine, which was supposedly abrogated by Congress in the
Submerged Lands Act.
The Court dealt with the contention that Congress, in passing
the Submerged Lands Act, had repudiated the doctrine enunciated
in United States v. Californiaby stating that it was their view that
the premise was embraced rather than repudiated by Congress in
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. . . . [Tlhis transfer was in
no wise inconsistent with paramount national power but was
merely an exercise of that authority."
The Court, in support of this view, emphasized a provision of the
Act which stated that the transfer did not affect the rights of the
United States in the outer continental shelf and which reasserted
the United States' rights of jurisdiction over shelf resources.35 This
declaration by Congress was found to be "squarely at odds with the
assertions of the States"3 that Congress had repudiated California.
Furthermore, the Court stated that Congress had "emphatically
implemented

'37

the Court's view that the United States, rather than

the states, has paramount rights in the seabed when Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 8 In support of its
statement, the Court cited the provision of the Act which
declared [it] to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition .... 11
The Court then reasoned that in light of the commercial practices
and activities which had grown up in reliance on the California
decision (which had been "embraced" by Congress), the case was
34. 95 S. Ct. at 1160.
35. Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights
of the United States to the natural resources of that portion of the subsoil and
seabed of the Continental Shelf lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
all of which natural resources appertain to the
beneath navigable waters ....
United States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is
confirmed.
43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
36. 95 S. Ct. at 1161.
37. Id.
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32, 1334-43 (1970); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (Supp. Feb. 1975).
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
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binding and must be given full stare decisis effect. The Court stated
its reluctance to disturb the established commercial practices, as
well as the statutory and regulatory framework which has grown up
around them.
Although the usage of the federal paramount rights doctrine in
Maine may reasonably be disputed, the Court's decision to disregard the historic title claim of the states is well founded. On a purely
historic basis, it is highly unlikely that the English Crown claimed
any sovereign rights in the territorial sea.40 The better view is that
the concept of the territorial sea as a recognized principle of international law did not emerge until much later." Even if such rights did
exist and did pass to the states, they existed at that time simply as
legal rights under international law vis-a-vis other nations, and the
question of mineral rights was never considered. As international
rights they had to pass from the individual states to the United
States either upon ratification of the Constitution or upon admission of the state to the Union under both international law and the
rationale of United States v. Texas. That this requires the exclusion
of the states from participation in development of the outer continental shelf is true, however, only if one accepts the Court's underlying assumption that the United States in its role as an external
sovereign requires exclusive and paramount rights amounting to
ownership of the outer continental shelf lands.
In resting its holding in United States v. Maine on its previously criticized and arguably abrogated holding in United States
v. California, the Court has brought into question once again the
"constitutional underpinnings" 4 of that case. As pointed out by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his California dissent,43 the holding of the
Court can be criticized as confusing dominion over mineral resources and property rights by the states with the imperium necessary on the part of the United States to act as a sovereign in the
international arena. Moreover, international law does not concern
itself with the domestic allocation of the benefits which accrue as a
result of the recognition of the exclusive rights of a nation to the
resources of its continental shelf.
40. In R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 175 (1876), the English court expressly rejected arguments
as to such a claim by the Crown before that date and expressed doubt as to its existence at
that time. It is generally held that while the concept of a protective buffer zone existed as
early as 1776, it did not settle into a legal concept with appurtenant property rights until the
19th century. Master's Report, supra note 7, at 76.
41. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1947).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 1160.
43. See note 20 supra.
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While the paramount right of the United States to act in national defense matters and to conduct foreign affairs is indisputable,
it does not require exclusive federal rights in the outer continental
shelf, as the Court in Maine found, any more than it requires federal
ownership of seacoast beaches or a three-mile strip of land along our
borders with Mexico and Canada. Property rights and state laws are
always subject to the paramount necessities of the national interest,
but the exercise of such rights by states or individuals is not incompatible with national sovereignty unless there is a direct conflict."
The absence of such a direct conflict between private property rights
and national sovereignty is graphically illustrated by the numerous
leases granted to private companies by the United States in these
very waters. And the logic of this argument is not lessened by the
fact that the nature of rights in outer continental shelf lands differs
from the nature of rights in the territorial sea. While every coastal
nation exercises full sovereignty (dominion and imperium) over
both the submerged lands and waters of its territorial sea,45 rights
in continental shelf lands beyond the territorial sea are limited by
international law to resource exploration and exploitation." Since
continental shelf rights are a creature of international law, they can
be claimed only by the external sovereign. The necessity of claiming
such international rights under the United States, however, does not
preclude their domestic allocation to either states or individuals (as
was done, for example, under the Submerged Lands Act). The Supreme Court has itself recognized this fact in stating that the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by a state for "purely domestic purposes" beyond the limits of the territorial sea claimed by the United
States under international law was not in conflict with the government's foreign relations policy. 7
Even if the constitutional policy underlying the holding in
United States v. Californiawas valid at the time of its adoption, it
is highly debatable whether Congress "embraced" that policy so
that it survived the Submerged Lands Act to be "emphatically implemented" in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. A reading of
the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act" establishes no
clear cut "embracing" of the California decision, but rather gives
the contrary impression.49 The grant of a three-mile boundary to the
44.
(1920).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 15, art. 1.
Shelf Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33 (1960).
Legislative History, supra note 10.
Id. at 1498-99.
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states may reasonably be read as a confirmation of at least that
amount of land,5" but it can hardly be read as a limitation on additional jurisdiction since the Act was expressly without prejudice to
any claim which a state might have that its boundary extended
beyond three miles.5 ' The statutory language can reasonably be interpreted that Congress intended to limit state claims concerning
the outer continental shelf, but the same language is equally susceptible to an interpretation that Congress intended to make a
claim in the international arena for the United States on behalf of
the people and the states. Because the United States Government
alone, as external sovereign can claim such rights under international law, the use of language of exclusivity and the failure to grant
outer continental shelf rights to the states may be indicative only
of a desire to assert a strong claim and to take no steps which could
be prejudicial to national rights under a concept which was then
vague and ambiguous and which could give foundation to extravagant claims by other nations.53 The strong language in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act and its legislative history,54 which the
Court reads as a claim of exclusive federal jurisdiction against the
states, may, then, in a similar manner, have been only the assertion
of a United States claim to shelf resources for its people and states.55
The question of Congressional intent to grant rights in the continental shelf to the states may be moot, however, in light of the argument advanced by some scholars that these rights have always existed in the states by virtue of the allocation of powers under the
Constitution ."
50. Id. at 1484-85.
51. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). See note 35 supra. The original text of this section provided
that nothing in the Act should be deemed to affect the issues between the United States and
the respective states relating to the outer continental shelf lands. It was later changed to its
present text, vesting such lands in the United States. Legislative History, supra note 10, at
1491.
53. Many other nations have made assertions to a similar effect with respect
to their continental shelves, and the committee believes it proper and necessary
that the Congress make such an assertion on behalf of the United States ...
H. R. 4198 asserts as against the other nations of the world the claim of
the United States to the natural resources in the Continental Shelf.
Legislative History, supra note 10, at 1391 (emphasis added).
54. Legislative History of the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act, 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2177.
55. But see 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975), providing that:
The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United
States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer
Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof . . ..
56. See Note, Right, Title and Interest in the TerritorialSea: Federal and State Claims
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Regardless of whether the Submerged Lands Act and Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act are interpreted as intending to expressly nullify or embrace California, the very passage of the Submerged Land Act can only be interpreted as resulting in the de facto
repudiation of the Court's holding and rationale in the California,
Louisiana, and Texas cases. The viability of the doctrine that the
national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs and world commerce require paramount federal rights in coastal waters is highly
doubtful when it is considered that such rights have been exercised
for only six years57 out of the nearly 200 years of the nation's history.
The paramount necessity of United States ownership of submerged
lands has never been demonstrated and is defeated by its factual
non-existence. Yet the Court used it as the foundation of its holding
in Maine.
Absent the underlying constitutional policy which ostensibly
led to the decision in California, the decisions in Texas and
Louisiana lose much of their value as precedent. Accordingly, the
way might be opened to historic and constitutional claims to outer
continental shelf lands by states who were not parties to
Maine-particularly by Alaska and Hawaii, which were admitted to
the union after 1953 and thus could not have surrendered their
claims by the operation of non-existent constitutional necessity.
Since neither of these states is presently bound by any decision in
this area, the claims of Hawaii and Alaska might be based on their
prior status as independent nation and foreign possession, respectively. Successful claims by either of these states might pave the
way for successful reassertion of claims by other states to similar
rights on historic or constitutional grounds.
At the very least, the recognition that the Constitution does not
require paramount federal rights would permit the implementation
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Californiato the effect that
the allocation of rights in the outer continental shelf is not suitable
for adjudication, but is in reality a political question concerning the
allocation of powers under our federal system. Such a proposal was
set forth in an amicus curiae brief 8 in Maine, but was implicitly
rejected by the Court. Recognition must be given to the fact that
states are a major part of our political system and have vital concerns regarding these submerged lands.
in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 463 (1974).

57. From the California decision in 1947 until the passage of the Submerged Lands Act
in 1953.

58. Brief for the Florida Council of 100, Inc. as amicus curiae at 46-57, United States v.
Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
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Coastal states suffer not only the ecological impact of offshore
development and oil spills, but also the economic and social impact
of onshore support facilities.5" Recent legislation"0 has recognized
these important state interests, and proposed legislation would further recognize these impacts and have the states participating in the
revenues from offshore operations." If the Congress takes such great
pains to recognize the interests of the states in the outer continental
shelf, it would seem that the Supreme Court should do no less. Such
recognition should not be impeded by the Court's professed reluctance to disturb established commercial practice and reliance since
the Court was more than willing to upset practices of over 170 years
by its original holding in California.
Unless the Court, or Congress, adopts another solution to the
entire problem, the outlook for the future is that in all likelihood
this "interminable litigation""2 will continue. The questionable constitutional policy basis of United States v. California and United
States v. Maine will only encourage litigation by other states hoping
to persuade yet another Court of their rights. The vast amount of
money at stake and the increasing sensitivity to vital environmental
issues virtually ensures this. Developments in the international law
of the sea may also prove fertile ground for further federal-state
submerged lands litigation. International rights in offshore resources are currently in a state of flux, and the expansion of the
United States territorial sea to 12 miles or the recognition of a 200mile economic resource zone jurisdiction will no doubt lead to state
claims for participation in the new rights under the auspices of
federalism. 3 Without a more rational and comprehensive allocation
59. For example, California would have been spared, in all likelihood, from the ecological
consequences of the Santa Barbara oil spill if the rigs operating just a few miles off its coast
had been operating under its standards for drilling safety rather than the laxer federal standards. Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil Spills: An Evaluationof Recent United States Responses,
7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 528 (1970).
60. See, e.g., Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1504(h)(2), 1508 (Supp. Feb.
1975); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972); Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o) (Supp. III, 1973).
61. Bills introduced into the First Session of the 94th Congress include H.R. 376 and S.
130 dealing with revenue sharing; S.81 giving coastal state governors veto power over offshore
leases and S. 521 and S. 426 dealing with compensation of coastal states for the impact of
offshore development.
62. Legislative History, supra note 10, at 1386.
63. While there has been no resolution of these issues by the current United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, there seems to be a widespread consensus that a 12-mile
territorial sea as well as a 200-mile economic resource zone jurisdiction will be a reality in
the near future. See generally AN ANONYMOUS DRAFT TREATY ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (U.
Miami Sea Grant Technical Bulletin No. 29, March 1975).
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of rights in the outer continental shelf, litigation may well continue
into the next century until the issues are finally rendered moot by
the exhaustion of the oil and gas reserves-unless, of course, there
is something else of value out there to be exploited.
ANDREW

W.

ANDERSON

Florida's Slice of the Offshore Pie
The multibillion dollar question of who owns the seabed and
natural resources in the seabed off Florida's coastline was answered
by the United States Supreme Court, which, in affirming its special
master's report,' held: Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,2
Congress granted the State of Florida title to and ownership of the
seabed and the natural resources of the seabed lying within the state
boundaries approved by Congress,3 but in no event more than 3
geographical miles4 into the Atlantic Ocean or 3 marine leagues 5 into
1. A special master may be appointed by the Court to aid it in obtaining facts and
deciding issues in complicated litigation. His powers are specified by the Court and his
reports and recommendations are advisory only, subject to objections and exceptions by the
parties. The Court will determine all critical motions and grant or deny the ultimate relief.
It will, however, accept the master's report unless it is clearly erroneous. R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 408-09 (4th ed. 1969).
2. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970), is an affirmative
quitclaim grant from the federal government to the states of the title to and ownership of
the lands beneath the navigable waters within the boundaries of the states, as those terms
are defined under the Act. See note 3 infra.
3. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970), defines the term
"boundaries" to include:
the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico. . . as
they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by the Congress, or as extended or confirmed pursuant to section
1321 of this title but in no event shall the term "boundaries" or the term "lands
beneath navigable waters" be interpreted as extending from the coast line more
than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean or
more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. (emphasis added).
The Court generally approved the special master's findings as to the location of these
boundaries. The exceptions of the United States to the finding that a portion of Florida Bay
was a "juridical" bay and to the drawing of "closing" lines around three groups of islands
(Dry Tortugas, Marquesas Keys, and "lower" Florida Keys) were referred back to the special
master for further consideration. See notes 38-40 infra and text accompanying notes 37-45
infra.
4. A geographical or nautical mile equals 6,076.11549 feet.
5. A league is approximately 9 geographical miles. Florida's claim of up to a 3 league
boundary off its Gulf coast under the authority of the Submerged Lands Act was previously
established in United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). This decision left several important questions unanswered, however, such as the location of the boundary between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.

